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Placing the poor while keeping the rich in their place:
separating strategies for optimally managing residential mobility and
assimilation
Jonathan P. Caulkins1, Gustav Feichtinger2, Dieter Grass3,
Michael Johnson4, Gernot Tragler5, Yuri Yegorov6
Abstract
A central objective of modern US housing policy is deconcentrating poverty through
“housing mobility programs” that move poor families into middle class neighborhoods.
Pursuing these policies too aggressively risks inducing middle class ﬂight, but being too
cautious squanders the opportunity to help more poor families. This paper presents a
stylized dynamic optimization model that captures this tension. With base-case parame-
ter values, cost considerations limit mobility programs before ﬂight becomes excessive.
However, for modest departures reﬂecting stronger ﬂight tendencies and/or weaker des-
tination neighborhoods, other outcomes emerge. In particular, we ﬁnd state-dependence
and multiple equilibria, including both de-populated and oversized outcomes. For certain
sets of parameters there exists a Skiba point that separates initial conditions for which the
optimal strategy leads to substantial ﬂight and depopulation from those for which the op-
timal strategy retains or even expands the middle class population. These results suggest
the value of estimating middle-class neighborhoods’ “carrying capacity” for absorbing
mobility program placements and further modeling of dynamic response.
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1. Introduction
This paper addresses the dynamic optimization problem faced by a social planner who
wants to integrate a stream of poor families into an existing middle-class neighborhood
without inducing“middle-class ﬂight”. Attempting to place “too many” poor families too
quickly could induce current residents to relocate and/or deter afﬂuent residents of other
communities from moving in, both of which could reduce the tax base of the communi-
ties to which poor families relocate. On the other hand, placing too few poor families
squanders the opportunity to use the resources of the community to help assimilate poor
families into the middle class.
The model is highly stylized but is inspired by a pressing practical problem. The
United States has pockets of concentrated poverty in most of its major cities and some
adjoining older suburbs. Upward social mobility from these neighborhoods is limited,
creating a persistent “underclass” of the “truly disadvantaged” (Wilson 1987). Some of
these neighborhoods contain publicly-subsidized housing developments. Over the last
ten years the government has pursued an active policy of “de-concentrating” poverty by
subsidizingmovementof tenants fromhigh-poverty,racially segregatedcommunitiesinto
more afﬂuent neighborhoods using “housing mobility programs” such as the nationwide
Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment 1999). The underlying premise, for which there is considerable empirical
support, is that poor families can do better on a variety of social, health, education, and
economicindicators if they have the opportunityto choose good-qualityhousingin more-
afﬂuent destination communities (Johnson, Ladd, and Ludwig 2001).
The model is formulated as an optimal dynamic control problem. This is a natural
framework for reﬂecting the dynamic, endogenous response of current residents to an
inﬂow of poor residents, but to the best of our knowledge this methodology has rarely
beenusedto studyhousingissues andis not usedveryfrequentlyin demographicresearch
more generally. Note: city growth is not the only domain of interest to demographers
that invites dynamic models with growth under externalities. Another example would
be ecological models where both the ﬂow of agricultural products and the stock of wild
nature bring utility.
This dynamic approach generates interesting insights. For example, the model dis-
plays “tipping” – the phenomena studied extensively by Schelling (1973) of having mul-
tiple stable equilibria surrounded by neighborhoods of attraction and unstable equilibria,
although in this case this characterization pertains to trajectories observed when the so-
cially optimal policy is pursued, not the uncontrolled dynamics.
The source of tipping here is akin to that in a much earlier model of housing segrega-
tion by Schelling (1971), namely externalities imposed by neighbours. Schelling’s orig-
inal model was written for racial segregation, but it can be applied to any social groups
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with little tolerance to each other. In this case, economic class. Unlike Schelling’s and
other traditional models, ours explicitly includes two types of externalities: (1) negative
externalities generated by poor families and which are of private concern to the middle-
class and (2) positive externalities generated by middle class families and which are of
interest to the social planner at least in part because of their effect on the population dy-
namics. On theotherhand,Schelling’smodelrelied onaspatial conceptofneighborhood,
whereas we abstract from an explicit grid representation of neighborhoodlocation.
As so often occurs, bringing new methods to a problem domain generates results
that are interesting from the methodological perspective. In this case we ﬁnd a one-state
model with two so-called DNS thresholds and a “lens” that focuses candidate solution
trajectories in a way that lets them pass through a singularity. Mathematical properties of
the lens are explored by Caulkins et al. (2004), who primarily consider a simpler version
of this model (one without assimilation) and for more arbitrary parameter values. Here
we simply use those properties when establishing what are the optimal solutions; readers
are referred to the earlier paper for derivation of those properties.
Paper structure. In Section 2 we elaborate on the policy context examined. Section 3
introduces the formal assumptions and formulation of the mathematical model, while
Section 4 provides its qualitative analysis. In Section 5 we discuss what are realistic
parameter values for the model. Section 6 describes the results of numerical simulations
and comparative statics, that often reveal structural changes. It is a core part of the paper,
sincemanypolicyissues arealso discussedhere,as well as bifurcationdiagramsandother
simulation results. The paper ends with conclusions and policy implications.
2. Policy context
The recent emphasis on integratinglow-incomefamilies into middle-class neighborhoods
represents a substantial shift in housing policy. Public housing in the US was originally
largely a product of the Great Depression and immediate post World-War II era. The
emphasis was on increasing the supply of affordable housing by building geographically
concentratedprojects run by public housingauthorities (PHAs). Much of the countrywas
racially segregated at the time, and PHAs were no different. As Popkin, Rosenbaum, and
Meaden (1993, p. 179) note, “Over several generations, many public housing authori-
ties established and perpetuatedracially segregatedand discriminatory systems for public
housing and other housing assistance, in violation of fair housing laws.”
A series of civil rights lawsuits begun in the 1960s and continuing into the 1980s
compelled PHAs to de-segregate these housing projects. In a number of cities it was
difﬁcult to achieve integration by placing minorities in majority white projects and vice
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versa, e.g., because the vast majority of current residents and of people seeking public
housing were minority or because members of one group refused offers of placement in
facilities where they would be in the minority. Indeed in a series of Texas court cases
known collectively as the Young case it was ruled that massive and mandatory transfer of
tenants within public housing should not be seen as the primary remedy.
An alternative strategy was pioneered in the settlement to the Gautreaux class-action
suit originallyﬁled in Chicago in 1966. That settlement sought to remediate past discrim-
ination by moving low-income African-Americans to white areas via “Section 8” certiﬁ-
cates and vouchers that subsidized the rent tenants paid to private landlords in “scattered
site housing” instead of placing them in other PHA projects.
Evaluations of the Gautreaux experiment found that participants who moved to sub-
urban communities enjoyed better educational and labor market outcomes than did par-
ticipants who moved to neighborhoods within the central city (Popkin, Rosenbaum, and
Meaden 1993, Rosenbaum 1995). These results came to light at a time when a consensus
was emergingin the social science literature that neighborhoodattributes inﬂuence a vari-
ety of economic, health, and criminal behaviors, and that the proportion of neighborhood
households with incomes below the poverty line is a particularly important attribute (e.g.,
Mayer and Jencks 1989, Massey, Gross, and Eggers 1991, Turner and Gould Ellen 1997).
In light of these developments, the Clinton Administration broke with the past policy
of contesting the lawsuits and fundamentally changed the goal of federal housing pol-
icy from supplying housing units to expanding opportunities for tenants to live in high-
quality, desegregated neighborhoods,both by converting traditional housing projects into
mixed-incomeresidentialdevelopments(so-called“HOPE VI” revitalizations)and byag-
gressively using vouchers to place tenants in privately-ownedscattered site housing.
A leading example of this new policy is the Moving To Opportunity for Fair Housing
(MTO) program launched by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development in
1994. Unlike the Gautreaux settlement, MTO was cast in terms of economic not racial
integration. It employed means testing, not race, to determine eligibility, seeking to place




of families had incomes below the poverty line). Hence, in this paper we describe the
problem in terms of placing poor families in middle-class neighborhoods, not ethnic mi-
nority families in white neighborhoods. This is not meant in any way to deny the long
history of overt and tacit racial and ethnic discrimination related to housing opportunity
(Galster 1988). Indeed, race and economic-status are not separable in deﬁning disad-
vantage or opportunity in this context. Still, there are reasons for preferring to cast the
problem in economic terms. First, in other countries and, indeed, sometimes in the US,
integration pertains primarily to international immigrants who are not necessarily of a
different race than the “domestic” population (e.g., Betts and Fairlie 2003). Second, even
in the US, racial and ethnic composition and tensions are more complicated than black
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and white, with evidence of one minority group ﬂeeing from another (Fairlie 2002) and
middle-class minorities ﬂeeing from poor minorities (Winsberg 1985, Murphy 1995). Fi-
nally, residential segregation by race has been falling – albeit very slowly – in the US
since 1970, but economic segregationwithin race has been rising, particularly for minori-
ties (Jargowsky 1996).
A central concern with government interventions designed to place poor families in
middle-class neighborhoods is the possibility of adverse economic impact on the neigh-
borhood, e.g., through declining property values (Galster, Tatian, and Smith 1999, San-
tiago, Galster, and Tatian 2001) or triggering a downward economic spiral if long-time
residents move away (“middle-class ﬂight” or “white ﬂight” in the racial integration con-
text). There is a large literature on “ﬂight” that debates many things such as whether the
primary driver is increased egress or normal turnover coupled with lack of replacement
(c.f., Galster 1998, Gould Ellen 2000), but with some exceptions concerning particular
issues (e.g., Freeman and Rohe 2000), the consensus is that ﬂight still occurs and is an
important issue (Clotfelter 2001).
Clearly if the principal policy objective is to integrate poor families into middle-class
neighborhoods, that objective is undermined if there is a large net exodus of middle-
class neighbors. Hence, we view the policy planner’s objective with respect to a given
neighborhood as two-fold: place there as many poor families as possible while simulta-
neously maximizing the number of middle-class residents. This dual-objective is broader
than some in the literature, which focus exclusively on outcomes for the PHA/Section 8
tenants, althoughit still neglects outcomesfor poorfamilies “left behind”in the neighbor-
hoodsfromwhich the MTOfamilies come(cf., Johnsonand Hurter2000). This exclusion
can be partially justiﬁed on grounds of tractability, lack of basis for estimating outcomes
for those left behind, and the parochial interests of municipal policy makers when the
movement from poor to middle-class neighborhoods crosses local jurisdictional bound-
aries.
Before proceeding, some caveats are in order. First, policy makers can counsel or
direct families to particular jurisdictions but not allocate them directly, so the control
variable is an abstraction of the overall counseling process. Second, we do not know for
sure that de-concentrating poverty is a good policy. Initial evidence related to short-term
MTO outcomes Johnson, Ladd, and Ludwig (2001) indicates that, compared to control
groups, “Section 8-only” and “experimental” groups have enjoyed substantial beneﬁts,
but it is not clear whether the effects will persist or whether they could be replicated if
the program were scaled up nationwide. Also, Galster (2002) notes that de-concentrating
poverty only improves aggregate social welfare under certain moderately strong assump-
tions concerning individual responses to neighborhood poverty levels. After reviewing
the literature, Mayer and Jencks (1989) observe that the empirical evidence is some-
what weak, outcomes can vary by context, and afﬂuent neighbors can be an advantage
http://www.demographic-research.org 5Caulkins et al.: Placing the poor while keeping the rich in their place
in some respects and a disadvantage in other respects. Manski (1993) elaborates on why
the econometric identiﬁcation problems limit the inferences that can reliably be drawn
from the empirical record. Furthermore, De Souza Briggs (2003) notes there is some-
thing of a choice between “cure” strategies that try to reduce segregation and “mitigate”
strategies that seek to reduce the social costs of segregation without actually changing
where people are willing and able to reside.
In this paper we take no position concerning whether integrating poor families into
middle-class neighborhoods is the right overall strategy. Rather, given that overall policy
directive, we explore the fundamentalmanagementquestion: how best could such a strat-
egy be implemented?
3. The model
The model presented here was ﬁrst introduced by Caulkins et al. (2004). It is highly
stylized, and many considerations are suppressed in the interest of framing an essential
dynamic of the problem in a novel way.
The key measure of the health of the neighborhood is taken to be the number of
middle-class families who live there at time





key policy variable is the rate at which poor families are placed in the neighborhood,





The number of middle-class families,
X, varies over time due to three inﬂuences.
First, there are the underlyingnatural or “uncontrolled”dynamics that would pertain even
if there were no MTOpolicyintervention(i.e.,
u
=
0 ). In manyrespects, housingmarkets
operate like other economic markets, with price adjusting to balance supply and demand.
For simplicity we imaginethe neighborhoodis an established, fully-developedarea so the
housingstock is ﬁxedat asize that wouldundernormalcircumstancessupportsomegiven
population (without loss of generality normalized to be unity). If the resident population
falls below that level, presumablylocal prices would decline, attracting immigrationfrom
other, comparable middle-class neighborhoods. Conversely, if the neighborhood popula-
tion grew beyond its normal level (
X
>
1), residents would ﬂow to other middle-class
neighborhoods that were less congested. Realistically, the neighborhood’s normal popu-
lation density depends on the surroundingcity’s overall growthtrajectory. If the city were
booming, the neighborhood’s normal population density would increase over time. Con-
versely if the population base were eroding. We abstract from such considerations and
imagine that the normal population for this neighborhood is constant over time. There
7Note that the time argument
t will mostly be omitted in what follows.
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does notappearto be a deﬁnitive,standardmodel in the literaturefor describingthese nat-
ural adjustment processes. Hence, for convenience we adopt the familiar logistic growth
curve.
Thesecondfactorinﬂuencingchangesinthestockofmiddle-classresidentsis“middle-
class ﬂight” (and/or “middle-class avoidance”)induced by the placement of poor families
in the neighborhood. Again there does not appear to be a standard functional form in the
literature, in part becausethe reality is rathermore complicatedthan what can be captured
in a one-state model. For example, Galster (1998) ﬁnds that racial transition depends not
only on racial composition in the immediate neighborhood,but also on proximity to other
majority minority areas, attitudes, and afﬁrmative marketing strategies. Likewise, a one-
state model cannot reﬂect details of the spatial distribution (DeMarco and Galster 1993).
Also, ﬂight may be driven not only by immigration into the residential neighborhood but
rather by immigration of children into the school district (e.g., Clotfelter 2001, Fairlie
2002). Perhaps not surprisingly some subgroups appear more likely to ﬂee than others.
E.g., Gould Ellen (2000)argues that homeownersare more likely to leave than are renters
and that families with children are more likely to ﬂee than families without children, par-
ticularly if the children attend public schools.
One central question is whether ﬂight is driven more by the current inﬂow of poor
immigrants or by their accumulation over time, perhaps relative to the size of the stock
of middle-class families. On that point, there seems to be some reason to believe it is the
current inﬂow. E.g., Gould Ellen (2000, p. 686) argues that “whites do not appear to care
very much about the proportionof a neighborhoodthat is African-American,[but] whites
do tend to avoid neighborhoods in which the proportion of families who are African-
American is increasing (independent of the current size of the minority population)”.
Again we opt for the beneﬁts of simplicity and assume that middle-class ﬂight is simply
proportional to the rate of inﬂow of poor families. This is akin to the ﬁnding of Betts and
Fairlie (2003) in the context of native-born and immigrant populations that “For every
four immigrants who arrive in public high schools, it is estimated that one native student
switches to a private school.”
The ﬁnal factor inﬂuencing changes in the stock of middle-class residents is the rate
at which incoming poor families are “assimilated”. That such assimilation can occur is
in some sense an underlying premise of the overall policy. The idea is not so much that
poor families moving to middle-class neighborhoods will simply derive great short-term
happiness from having afﬂuent neighbors. Indeed, as Mayer and Jencks (1989) note, one
school of thought emphasizes that afﬂuent neighbors can provoke resentment among the
poor over their relative deprivation. Rather, the hope is that immersion in a middle-class
neighborhood will improve outcomes, including labor market participation and income,
for the pooradults andeducationaloutcomesfor their children, which translate into social
opportunity and higher incomes over time.
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Presumably the number of poor people assimilating is increasing both in the number
who are placed and, hence, are candidates for assimilation (i.e., is increasing in
u) and
also in the number of middle-class neighbors (
X). Again, the literature does not offer
guidance as to what functional forms might be preferred. At the suggestion of Rosser, we
opt for a simple bi-linear relationship: assimilation is proportionalto the product of
u and
X.
One potentially awkward aspect of this simple form is that if
X is large enough,
the proportionality constant
￿ times
X may exceed 1, implying that the number of poor
people being assimilated can exceed the number of poor people being placed there by
the policy maker through the housing subsidy program. That is by no means implausible
since poor people in the program might attract other people to enter the neighborhood
who are not part of the formal program and, hence, do not have their ﬂow enter the cost-
function and are not so visible as to affect out-migration. E.g., residents might be very
conscious of poor people placed by a formal public program, but their friends who just
movein ontheir ownmaynotbe noticedand,hence, mightnotengenderthesame amount
of middle-class ﬂight. Nevertheless, it will be important to remember this interpretation





The other great simpliﬁcationof assimilation in this modelstems directly fromhaving
only a single state variable to represent the neighborhood’s current population. As a
result, newly placed poor families either assimilate immediately or depart. There are not
additional states that explicitly model the gradual process by which a family remaining
in the neighborhood moves up the socio-economic ladder over time. Elaborating on that
dimension would be an important extension for further research.























￿ are positive constants governing, respectively, the speed with which
the equilibrium population is approached, the extent of middle-class ﬂight, and the rate
of assimilation of poor families into the middle class. Note that families that are not
assimilated play no further role in the state dynamics because there is not a second state
variable to track poor people living in the neighborhood. Practically speaking, those that
do not assimilate might well leave the community, particularly after their eligibility for
tenant-based housing subsidies expires and they would have to pay full market rates for
housing.
To complete the formulation we must specify an objective function. We adopt the fa-
miliar perspective of maximizing the inﬁnite-horizon, discounted net social beneﬁt. 8 The
8Note that we assume an inﬁnite planning horizon for reasons of analytical tractability. For instance, this
assumption is essential for the use of the powerful phase-plane analyses as carried out later in this paper.
However, it is certainly also possible to deal with a ﬁnite horizon.
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review of the policy context above justiﬁes counting both placing poor families (
u) and
maintaining middle-class residents (
X) as socially beneﬁcial. Without loss of generality,
we scale the beneﬁt function so the coefﬁcient on
u is unity and let
￿ denote the relative
beneﬁt per unit time of
X compared with
u.
Finally, we presume that the policy intervention itself carries some cost, including
administrative costs, costs of counseling families concerning their initial placement and
follow up, property value impacts, and deadweight losses associated with constraining
choices. We presume for the standard diminishing returns arguments that these costs are
convex. Again in the absence of evidence favoring one speciﬁc functional form over
another, we opt for simplicity and use a quadratic form. The linear term is subsumed into
the (scaled) coefﬁcient on
u, leaving only the squared term to appear independentlyin the
objective function.


















































































r is the time discount rate and
c is the program cost coefﬁcient.
It should be clear to the reader that this is a highly stylized model not only in its
structural simplicity (e.g., using a single state variable to represent the neighborhood’s
resident population) but also in terms of the functional forms employed, none of which
have been validated in any sense of the word. Hence, we focus on qualitative insights, not
speciﬁc numerical results and view this entire paper as somewhat exploratory.
4. Qualitative analysis
4.1 Derivation of the canonical system
The analysis proceeds in the usual manner for an optimal dynamic control problem (cf.,
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where the Hamiltonian maximizing condition (6) must hold for interior solutions. 9
If we exclude
























































































4.2 Isoclines and steady states








































￿, separating two branches of this curve. The general shape depends on the






1, both branches have positive slope, and
while crossing
X









1, the left branch
has an inverse-






0, has a more complicated form, but some qualitative in-










￿ marks the border between two zones, where the vector ﬁeld
is continuous. This singularity is broken only in one point, which belongs to the isocline































). This point (which we will call the critical
point) has an important role, and its properties will be elaborated below.
Thepointsofintersectionbetweentheisoclinesgiveus candidatesforequilibria. Note






























































































0, even the second order condition for an interior maximum is satisﬁed.
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ically we have multiple equilibria. Having
c
>





this can increase the number of equilibria. Further analysis can be done using numerical




Caulkins et al. (2004).
4.3 Critical line and lens
Before proceedingwith the analysis of the case
￿
>
0, we need to address one mathemat-
ical oddity. Typically when solving dynamical systems, if there is more than one saddle
point, then those saddle points are separated by some unstable equilibria. However, it
turns out that for many parameter values, we ﬁnd for
X
>
0 three saddle points but just
one unstable equilibrium. Obviously in a one-state model, one unstable equilibrium can’t
separate all pairs of saddle points. It turns out that in this model the critical point behaves
in a rather interesting and unusual way. It is not a steady state, but it acts like an unstable
equilibrium in the sense of separating successive saddle point equilibria.
The properties of this critical point are explored by Caulkins et al. (2004) who show
that a ﬁnite measure of trajectories can pass between two semiplanes separated by a sin-









from right to left. These observations solve the paradox about the coexistence of one un-
stable node with three saddles and helps us to determine which dynamic trajectories are
candidates for optimal solutions.
4.4 Limitations of the qualitative analysis
Except for the special case
￿
=
0the underlying problem is too hard to address analyti-
cally. That special case of no assimilation is investigated by Caulkins et al. (2004). Here
we pursue the more realistic and complicated case for
￿
>
0 numerically. To do so, it is
important to give some thought to appropriate ranges for the parameter values, which is
the content of the following section.
5. Choice of parameters
5.1 Housing market adjustment speed coefﬁcient,
a










). That means parameter
a can be in-
terpreted as the half-life of decay of vacancies when the neighborhood is near its uncon-
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trolled equilibrium. That is, how long, on average, does it take for a house to sell in a
healthy middle-class neighborhood(
X close to 1)?
































7, which we round up to a base case of 2.
However,the AmericanHousingSurvey2001(AHS) (U.S. Census Bureau 2004b)in-
dicatesthat thereis considerablevariationin time spentonthemarket,andlowervaluesof
parameter
a can yield qualitatively different results, so we also explore the consequences
of introducing housing mobility programs to neighborhoods with weaker real estate mar-





% ofunits were onthe market formore than2 years.
The data are reported in categories, so we do not know exactly what vacancy period is the













2 (vacancy period 41.6 months) because
that is our base case value (
a
=




￿ reﬂects the “success” or “assimilation” rate for persons who participate
in housing mobility programs, i.e. the proportion of families initially placed in low-
poverty or low-percent minority (what we call “middle-class”) neighborhood who stay
for an extended period of time.
The MTO Interim Impacts Evaluation (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment 2003) reports that
3
5
% of all “experimental group” families who successfully
found rental housing between 1994 and 1998 were recorded in 2002 as living in Census
tracts with Census 2000 poverty rates of
2
0




% of treatment group started on welfare. Thirteen quarters later it fell to
3
4











DeLuca and Rosenbaum (2003) concluded that for the Gautreaux program, after an
average of 17 years post-move, about
5
7








less initially remain in neighborhoods that are
3
0
% black or less. This would imply a























%in our base case.
5.3 Flight coefﬁcient,
￿
Betts and Fairlie (2003) ﬁnd that one native-born person moved out of the school district






5 in their context. Flight
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from lower-class could be stronger than ﬂight from immigrants, suggesting somewhat
larger values of
￿ in our context.
Gould Ellen (2000, p. 124) reports that “The probability of the typical white home-






5 percentage points higher when the black popu-
lation has grown by 10 percentage points over the decade.” For a neighborhood around
the uncontrolled steady state, an increase of
1
0


























































5 as our base case, but also consider sensitivity excur-



















￿ is the value per middle class family per year relative to the value per low-
income family placed, so ﬁrst we need the value per low-income family placed. The
ONDCP (2002, Table 13) is a federal government agency that offers an estimate of the
monetary value of saving a high-risk youth, based on the work by Cohen (1998). Interpo-
lating for a
5

































% were “unhappy, sad, or depressed”.
These short-termﬁndings might suggest that about
1
2
% of kids will be “saved”, but gains
can erode over time. The MTO experiment is too recent for there to be long-run results,
but Caulkins et al. (2002) found that, in the context of drug prevention, long-term gains

















































The average cost per family placed is roughly the $70M Congress appropriated di-




























X declines in this model, it is the result of middle class ﬂight, not middle
class death, so it is relevant to focus on the local municipality’s marginal loss of local tax
revenue. Personal income in the US in 1995 was about $
4
:
3B (counting wages, salary,
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5.5 Quadratic cost coefﬁcient,
c
There is currently no empirical basis for estimating parameter
c. The inﬂow
u in the ﬁve





















2 term is negligible and, indeed, there is no discernable relationship between
costs per person placed and placement intensity across the ﬁve cities.
Hence, what value of parameter
c makes sense is best thought of by reference to the






that, leaving aside the
￿














c. In other words, when
focusing only on short-run considerations, the convex program costs make the preferred



















these rates are placing one poor family per 40 middle class families per year and one poor
family per 20 middle class families per year, respectively. At one level these seem about
right. The ﬁrst might be a good target; the second might be overly aggressive. However,
those judgments are probably tempered by long-run considerations including ﬂight and
assimilation. Focusing only on the short-run considerations driven by the convexity of
the program cost structure, the optimal and maximum desirable placement rates might





















2as merely a sensitivity excursion.
5.6 Discount rate,
r












5.7 Summary of parameter values
Table 1 summarizes the parametervalues used in numericalexperiments. In this paper we






















￿ to vary, when performing comparative static analysis. Many other parameter combina-
tions were also investigated, but they do not augment signiﬁcantly those represented here
or, in the case of varying
￿, in Caulkins et al. (2004).
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Table 1: Summary of estimates for model parameters
Parameter Base Case
r, discount rate 0.05
a, housing market adjustment speed 2
￿, ﬂight coefﬁcient 0.5
￿, assimilation coefﬁcient 0.45
￿, objective function coefﬁcient on middle class state 0.02
c, program cost coefﬁcient 2 and 20
6. Results of numerical simulations
6.1 Economic meaning of different equilibria
Numerical simulations reveal the existence of up to three saddle point equilibria of differ-
ent types. To understand them intuitively, it is useful to contrast them with what happens






























With a mobility program (
u
>








)) inﬂuence the dynamics of




and assimilation of immigrants (
￿
X
u).10 The relative and absolute magnitudes of these
three ﬂows differ in the three types of saddle point equilibria.
In the ﬁrst type of equilibrium, the state
X is substantially below the natural level
1, undermining assimilation. In such equilibria, it is growth via the logistic term (in-
migration of families attracted by a relatively abundant housing stock) that is primarily
responsibleforoff-settingmobilityprogram-inducedmiddle-classﬂight. Inthecasewhen
the equilibrium









u must be quite small as well. This is a relatively unhealthy community, but
it could still be optimal to pursue a policy that creates such a community if the decision
maker is relatively short-sighted (
r large) and values highly program placements relative
to other considerations(
￿ and
c small). Such equilibria might be called “small
X, modest
u equilibria.”
Another type of equilibrium with
u
>
0 is close to the uncontrolled equilibrium
(
X near 1). At this point the natural population growth is small (logistic term is close
10The functional form of the assimilation term was proposed to the authors by Barkley Rosser (personal
communication).
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to
0), and the typically modest inﬂow of poor families (
u small to moderate) generates
assimilation and ﬂight to roughly equal degrees, leaving the middle-class population very
near its normal level in the absence of a control (
X close to 1). In such an equilibrium,
the poverty de-concentration program does not dramatically alter the character of the
neighborhood,and we might call it a “low
u, average
X equilibrium.”




not only program-induced middle-class ﬂight but also the natural population dynamics
tend to reduce
X. Assimilation is the only factor tending to increase
X and preserve the
high population density. Due to the assumption that assimilation is proportional to the
level of
X, a high proportion of the fairly large inﬂow of poor families,
u, is assimilated.
However, even the middle-class residents are relatively transient, leaving at high rates.
Such equilibria might be called “high
X, high
u” equilibria, and be thought of as akin to
the transition neighborhoodsin New York City that assimilate foreign immigrants.
Depending on the parameter values, 1, 2, or all 3 equilibria may exist as saddle point
solutions to the canonical system. In some sense the policy questions in this model boil
down to: for any given initial neighborhood, under what conditions is it optimal to ap-




With base case parameter values, there are saddles corresponding to all three equilib-
ria. There is a vortex between the ﬁrst two, and the lens separates the second and third.








4, dominates. That means, regardless of
the initial state, it is always optimal to converge to a standard middle class neighborhood
with mobility programs run at such a modest rate that they have minimal impact on the
neighborhood.11
That the third saddle can never be a long-runoptimumfollows directly from the prop-
erties of the lens sketched above. Since the ﬂow lines all pass from right to left, all trajec-
tories starting with large
X pass through the lens from right to left and must approach a
long-run equilibrium that is to the left of the lens.
That the small
X equilibrium can never be optimal requires a numerical proof anal-
ogous to that given in Caulkins et al. (2004). Intuitively, the essence of the proof is that







c, which does not make economic sense. (With such high
u, the
short-term costs of the mobility program undercut even its short-run beneﬁts. Further-
more, there is rapid erosion of the middle-class population due to ﬂight, and the shadow
11Later we will refer to this case as Fig. 0, but we do not present it in the paper.
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value of the middle class population is always positive.)
If




c would be larger, so given the uncertainty concerning
the quadratic cost coefﬁcient








: The resulting phase portrait (Fig. 1) is topologically identical. (It,




0 is shown because it is easier to read.) The long-








4 to 0.99333, but otherwise there is little
difference.12
















































c. The steady states representing small and large cities are suboptimal.
Inthe followingsubsectionswe dealwithsensitivityanalysesfordifferentparameters.
For a better understanding of how the different cases discussed are interrelated, we pro-
vide a “road-map”in Fig. 2. This “road-map”shows interrelationsbetweenall considered
cases, marked as corresponding ﬁgures with particular parameter values.
12Clearly, the corresponding
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5. From there we continue by changing parameter
￿, which




5 (Fig. 3) and
1
:
5 (Figs. 4 and 5). Note that Figs. 4 and 5 differ only in the value of
c. Three ﬁgures at the bottom line have different values for parameter
a. In the cases of very low a (Figs. 7 and
8) we have Skiba points.
6.3 Sensitivity with respect to ﬂight parameter
￿








5 changes the picture considerably. Now the lens separates the ﬁrst two saddle points,
passing the ﬂow from left to right. The small
X equilibrium cannot be optimal due to a
theorem that says that the objective function value for a given level of the state variable




0isocline (see, e.g., Feichtinger and Hartl 1986,
p. 118), because the trajectory converging to the small
X steady state is closer to this
isocline than is the path leading to the equilibrium close to
1. The vortex and the far-
right saddle disappear, leaving the saddle near
X
=
1 as the only true candidate for a
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long-run equilibrium. That is, this reduction in the ﬂight parameter only reinforces the
strengthof themiddle-typesaddle. Substantively,theonlyconsequenceis thatthis greater
strength allows the mobility programs to increase the population to slightly more than its
















































































































), it also leaves the




5 (Fig. 4) just pushes the long-run



















However, if the mobility program is cheaper (
c
=


















u at the unstable node smaller and at the same time leads to an increase of the
X
value for the equilibrium, which corresponds to an oversized city.






























































3) is a vortex.
As one can see from Fig. 5, the vortex has dropped substantially (lower value of
u),
approaching the levels of those for the saddle points. While at this point the equilibrium
with
X near 1 continues to dominate, that dominance could be threatened by further
parameter changes, such as a decline in the objective function coefﬁcient
￿.
To summarize, given base-case values of the other parameters or even with mobility
program costs reduced (smaller
c), varying the extent of ﬂight (parameter
￿) seems to
affect only the optimal intensity of the mobility program. (The greater the proclivity
toward ﬂight, the less aggressively the program should be pursued.) It does not alter
the general strategy of preserving the essential character of the neighborhood. We next
examine a parameter whose variation can lead to more fundamental changes in the policy
prescription.




































Note: The middle-size city still dominates. Small and large city (not shown) are suboptimal. The saddle paths





















































6.4 Sensitivity with respect to parameter
a
The housing market adjustment speed parameter (
a) turns out to play a key role in the
structure of the optimal housing mobility policy. When
a is rather large, as in our base
case, the middle equilibrium with
X close to 1 is strong because the uncontrolled com-










)) is powerful. One might say that our system
displays homeostasis 14, and parameter
a measures the strength of homeostasis. Just as
a strong virus attack can overwhelm a weakened immune system, we can expect that a
neighborhoodwith small (weakened)
a can be moved out of its natural equilibrium.
We have already considered several cases for large
a
=
2, shown in Figs. 1, 3-5.
Sometimes there are 4 equilibria, sometimes 2, but there is no policy impact: the middle-
size neighborhood is always located near the unperturbed value
X
=
1and it is always
optimal. Small reductions in the value of
a do not change this property. Even substantial
reductionof
a, from 2 to 0.2 (see Fig. 6) still preserve 4 equilibria: 3 saddles, correspond-





















14This term is often used in biological sciences to describe the systems that are able to return to their natural
steady state after being perturbed by external forces.
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1. Besides this complex structure, the middle-size




































































5. The horizontal dashed line represents the boundary solution with
u
=
0, which is a part of the
saddle path to the middle-sized city.
Although lower values of
a might be viewed as extreme cases, we should not ignore
them for two reasons. First, all of our parameter estimates involve judgments; changing
some others can increase the minimum value of
a such that different behaviors emerge.
Second, for whatever reasons, some neighborhoods might have “weakened homeostasis”
and correspondinglylow
a. For such values of
a, we found several topologicallydifferent
cases, where an optimal policy destroys the uniqueness of middle-size neighborhood as
an optimal solution and sometimes even eliminates it completely.










0 (see Fig. 7).
Here we still have 4 equilibria, and 3 of them are saddles, representing small, medium
size and large city. The main difference is that the unstable steady state becomes a node

















), we are indifferent between either going to the low










15For some details of Skiba points and their classiﬁcation see, e.g., Caulkins et al. (2004).
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all trajectories from the right to the left, to converge to the middle-size neighborhood.

















































































1 (including the saddle path to the middle-size city), pass through the lens at the critical line.
The results are even more dramatic when we reduce
a to this low level and also use
the lower placement cost
c
=
2. In general, reduction in
c leads to higher levels of
u





































both solutions play an important role, it is useful to characterize them. In the oversized
city the population stock exceeds the normal level by more than a factor of two, and the
equilibrium ﬂow of migrants (some of whom assimilate) is very high. At the same time,
while the ﬂow of migrants into the small neighborhood remains low, it does not have a
capacityto reach moreor less normalsize. Thereexists a threshold(strongSkiba point)at
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Figure 8: A Skiba point
X
s (between 2 saddles, separated by the critical line
X
￿)

















































1, there is convergence to the








































2. Ifwe startatthis Skibathreshold,thereexisttwotrajectories,converging
to left and right saddles and having identical value of the objective. In other words, at
X
S
we are indifferentin selecting a path thatconvergeseither to heavilyundersizedor heavily
oversized cities.
This case is also interesting mathematically, as it has not previously been described
in the dynamic optimization literature. There exists a substantial literature about Skiba
points 17, but in one-state models a Skiba point typically emerges near a vortex that sep-









1. The lens allows the trajectories to pass from the right to the left. But




￿ is such, that two trajecto-


























is always a convergence to the high population equilibrium. Hence, there should exist
a threshold as the border of these sets, and this can indeed be proven numerically (See
Fig. 10 with the details of Skiba point and its neighbourhood).
17For a recent and extensive survey on these thresholds, see Deissenberg et al. (2004).
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2 the difference between these trajectories is not visible in this illustration, for
topological reasons of course they never intersect. Isoclines, ﬁeld direction and the lens are also shown.
Thereexistsathirdtopologicallydifferenttypeofsolutionwith3saddlesanda vortex.
It has been described by Caulkins et al. (2004) but only occurs here if we change simul-








1, but opposite cases are also discovered), and we converge to







S, and to the high population equilibrium in
the oppositecase. While the middlesize equilibriumdoes exist as a candidateequilibrium
in this case, it is never optimal to converge to it.
http://www.demographic-research.org 25Caulkins et al.: Placing the poor while keeping the rich in their place























8 leads to the
high saddle.




It is interesting to examine a bifurcation diagram showing how the topological structure
of the solutions varies with
a (See Fig. 11). We see that when
a is decreased from its




























X equilibrium becomes negative (infeasible).






￿and the critical point is less than
X
=
1 . Here the pattern











1) the lower saddle is closer to 1, for a higher
a the upper saddle is closer to one.











7 we have 4 equilibria and all of them are positive.
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Figure 11: Bifurcation diagram in
a
￿































Note: Some phase diagrams have been shown already: for
a
=






5 see Fig. 8. Since
parameter c leads mostly to a change in
u and has less inﬂuence on















2 in this diagram.
6.6 Summary of sensitivity with respect to interactions between
a and
c
Reviewing the results above, we observe an interesting interaction between variation
(speciﬁcally reductions from basecase values) in parameters
a and
c. When
a is at its
(high) basecase value, then variation in
c does not alter the basic policy. Even when
mobility programs are cheap (
c is small), the optimal strategy is always to have the neigh-
borhood approach a situation very near its uncontrolled or “natural” state.
However, when
a is small, then the strategy depends strongly on the speciﬁc value of
c. When
c is at its (high) basecase value, we get a weak Skiba separating the small and
medium size equilibria. The mobility program should not be used in a way that alters the
basic character of the neighborhood, but if the neighborhood is initially depopulated, the
mobility program will be pursued in such a way that the neighborhoodnever recovers.
When
a is small and
c is small, we get a radically different prescription. Regardless
of the initial state of the neighborhood,it should never approachits natural long-runequi-
librium, even if it starts out at that size! Instead, if the initial population is low, it will
remain low. If the initial population is not low, then so many people should be placed in
the neighborhoodthat it eventually grows beyond its natural size, becoming densely pop-
ulated with newly assimilated immigrants who do not remain long (are fairly transient).
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7. Conclusions and policy implications
We analyzed a highly stylized model of how poverty deconcentration programs inﬂuence
population dynamics in the destination neighborhood. The model tracks the stock of
middle-class residents and the ﬂow of poor families entering the neighborhood. It consid-
ers the effects of both negative externalities that incoming poor families place on current
residents (includingﬂight) and positive externalities from middle-class neighborhoodson
incomingpoorfamilies (throughassimilation anddirectly in the social planner’sobjective
function). The model is formulated as a dynamic optimization problem faced by a gov-
ernmental entity that can control the rate at which the program places poor residents and
wishes to do so in a manner that maximizes the discounted weighted sum of net beneﬁts
over time.
This model is inspired by policy debates in the US regarding poverty deconcentration
through housing mobility initiatives. Typically these discussions, if translated into math-
ematics, would have the character of static concave maximization with a unique interior
optimum. Recent work has proposed non-monotonicobjective functions, emphasized the
inadequacy of analyses that focus solely on outcomes for the poor families, and devel-
oped policy prescriptions based on static, multi-objective optimization models. However,
no prior research known to us has explicitly addressed the dynamic nature of housing
mobility policy design.
For base case parameter values we get convergence to a unique equilibrium in which
the middle-class population is very close to its uncontrolled or natural level. This result
appears to be fairly robust with respect to parameters governing mobility program cost
and the extent of middle-class ﬂight induced per poor family placed in the neighborhood.
However,ifthe neighborhood’sunderlyingpopulationdynamicsarenotveryresilient,
in the sense that it can take a long time for population to adjust when it is either above
or below the uncontrolledor natural size, then other outcomes may be possible, or indeed
optimal. Somewhat similar results can pertain for short-sighted decision makers.
One alternative structure obtained via a “weak” Skiba point might be summarized,
“keepthe neighborhoodinits currentstate, evenif thatinitial state is de-populatedrelative
to its natural uncontrolled state.” In particular, if the neighborhood is already weakened
by under population, then paradoxically creating a new population inﬂow can prevent
the neighborhood from growing because the induced middle-class ﬂight exceeds the as-
similation of program participants, in part because the scarcity of current middle-class
neighbors undermines that assimilation.
If in addition to weak underlying population dynamics it is also the case that program
costs are low, thenyet anotherstructurecan emergevia a “strong”Skibathreshold. In that
case the Skiba threshold separates lower initial population levels for which it is optimal
to keep the neighborhoodunder-populatedfrom higher initial populationlevels for which
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the optimal strategy leads to a “super-populated”neighborhoodwith population densities
above those in the uncontrolled steady state. These outcomes involve high-inﬂow and
high assimilation of poor families into the middle class, but also relatively rapid outﬂow
of middle-class residents in response to both poor families entering and general popula-
tion pressure. The resulting transient, high-density neighborhoods might be thought of
as akin to those in New York City that traditionally absorbed large numbers of foreign
immigrants.
Methodologically one of the most interesting results was ﬁnding a critical point that
acts as a lens to focus trajectories in state-control space in a manner that lets them pass
through a singularity separating two continuous semi-planes. This point seems to be able
to separate saddles the way nodes and vortices often do. Because of the continuityof ﬂow
through that point, its existence can help reveal what the optimal solution strategy is and
how that strategy does and does not depend on various parameters.
Substantively these results have three principal implications. First, inasmuch as the
speciﬁc quantitative not just qualitative results can be trusted (which is subject to ques-
tion given how stylized the model is), it appears that placement rates far in excess of
those pursued by the Moving To Opportunity program may be both optimal and unlikely
to generate prohibitive levels of middle class ﬂight, at least with basecase parameters.
Second, dynamic modeling of population ﬂows related to housing mobility programs can
yield interesting, indeed surprising, results and merits further investigation. Third, the
likelihood of surprising or structurally different results seems to depend particularly on
the dynamic resilience of host neighborhoods, program costs, and the modeling of ﬂight
and assimilation. So those topics merit further investigation, particularly from a dynamic
perspective. We would highlight in particular the beneﬁts of a reﬁned model with a larger
state space to model explicitly the process of upward social mobility over time.
Explicitly specifying functional forms and constraining the state space to dimensions
that permit explicit dynamic optimization might inevitably involve a high degree of ab-
straction, but the modeling suggests the beneﬁts of realistic quantiﬁcation of a few at-
tributes whose importance exists independentof a dynamic optimization framework. No-
tably, how large is the stock of poor families that are eligible for mobility programs rel-
ative to the “carrying capacity” of neighborhoods in which they might be placed? In
addition, how quickly do each of these stocks grow? Growth for the former pertains to
some combination of the rates of upward and downward social mobility combined with
the natural reproductive rate for poor families. Growth rates for the latter pertain to how
quickly newly placed residents are assimilated, and how ﬂight depends on the rate and
accumulation of placed families.
At this point, it is not even clear whether in order of magnitude terms the absorptive
capacity of middle class neighborhoodsis large or small compared to the number of poor
families. If it is small, the housing mobility programs, no matter how desirable or cost-
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effective, must inevitably be a relative minor complement to core housing programs that
help poor families where they are now located. If it is large, then residential mobility
programs have the potential to be the primary strategy for meeting housing policy objec-
tives. The current model represents a small step toward trying to frame and answer such
fundamental questions.
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